diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/tpm-v2.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/tpm-v2.c | 423 |
1 files changed, 423 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/tpm-v2.c b/lib/tpm-v2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f89592d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/tpm-v2.c @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Bootlin + * Author: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> + */ + +#include <common.h> +#include <dm.h> +#include <tpm-common.h> +#include <tpm-v2.h> +#include "tpm-utils.h" + +u32 tpm2_startup(struct udevice *dev, enum tpm2_startup_types mode) +{ + const u8 command_v2[12] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), + tpm_u32(12), + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_STARTUP), + tpm_u16(mode), + }; + int ret; + + /* + * Note TPM2_Startup command will return RC_SUCCESS the first time, + * but will return RC_INITIALIZE otherwise. + */ + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); + if (ret && ret != TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE) + return ret; + + return 0; +} + +u32 tpm2_self_test(struct udevice *dev, enum tpm2_yes_no full_test) +{ + const u8 command_v2[12] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), + tpm_u32(11), + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST), + full_test, + }; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const char *pw, + const ssize_t pw_sz) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(27 + pw_sz), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_CLEAR), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(handle), /* TPM resource handle */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + pw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(pw_sz), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(pw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 27; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the password (if any) + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "s", + offset, pw, pw_sz); + offset += pw_sz; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const uint8_t *digest) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(33 + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(index), /* Handle (PCR Index) */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ + tpm_u32(1), /* Count (number of hashes) */ + tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), /* Algorithm of the hash */ + /* STRING(digest) Digest */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 33; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the digest + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "s", + offset, digest, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN); + offset += TPM2_DIGEST_LEN; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_pcr_read(struct udevice *dev, u32 idx, unsigned int idx_min_sz, + void *data, unsigned int *updates) +{ + u8 idx_array_sz = max(idx_min_sz, DIV_ROUND_UP(idx, 8)); + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(17 + idx_array_sz), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_PCR_READ), /* Command code */ + + /* TPML_PCR_SELECTION */ + tpm_u32(1), /* Number of selections */ + tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), /* Algorithm of the hash */ + idx_array_sz, /* Array size for selection */ + /* bitmap(idx) Selected PCR bitmap */ + }; + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + unsigned int pcr_sel_idx = idx / 8; + u8 pcr_sel_bit = BIT(idx % 8); + unsigned int counter = 0; + int ret; + + if (pack_byte_string(command_v2, COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE, "b", + 17 + pcr_sel_idx, pcr_sel_bit)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "ds", + 10, &counter, + response_len - TPM2_DIGEST_LEN, data, + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + if (updates) + *updates = counter; + + return 0; +} + +u32 tpm2_get_capability(struct udevice *dev, u32 capability, u32 property, + void *buf, size_t prop_count) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(22), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY), /* Command code */ + + tpm_u32(capability), /* Capability */ + tpm_u32(property), /* Property */ + tpm_u32(prop_count), /* Property count */ + }; + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; + unsigned int properties_off; + int ret; + + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * In the response buffer, the properties are located after the: + * tag (u16), response size (u32), response code (u32), + * YES/NO flag (u8), TPM_CAP (u32) and TPMU_CAPABILITIES (u32). + */ + properties_off = sizeof(u16) + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u32) + + sizeof(u8) + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u32); + memcpy(buf, &response[properties_off], response_len - properties_off); + + return 0; +} + +u32 tpm2_dam_reset(struct udevice *dev, const char *pw, const ssize_t pw_sz) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(27 + pw_sz), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_DAM_RESET), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT), /* TPM resource handle */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + pw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(pw_sz), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(pw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 27; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the password (if any) + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "s", + offset, pw, pw_sz); + offset += pw_sz; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_dam_parameters(struct udevice *dev, const char *pw, + const ssize_t pw_sz, unsigned int max_tries, + unsigned int recovery_time, + unsigned int lockout_recovery) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(27 + pw_sz + 12), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_DAM_PARAMETERS), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT), /* TPM resource handle */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + pw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(pw_sz), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(pw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + + /* LOCKOUT PARAMETERS */ + /* tpm_u32(max_tries) Max tries (0, always lock) */ + /* tpm_u32(recovery_time) Recovery time (0, no lock) */ + /* tpm_u32(lockout_recovery) Lockout recovery */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 27; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the password (if any) + * - max tries + * - recovery time + * - lockout recovery + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sddd", + offset, pw, pw_sz, + offset + pw_sz, max_tries, + offset + pw_sz + 4, recovery_time, + offset + pw_sz + 8, lockout_recovery); + offset += pw_sz + 12; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +int tpm2_change_auth(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const char *newpw, + const ssize_t newpw_sz, const char *oldpw, + const ssize_t oldpw_sz) +{ + unsigned int offset = 27; + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(offset + oldpw_sz + 2 + newpw_sz), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(handle), /* TPM resource handle */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + oldpw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(oldpw_sz) /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(oldpw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + + /* TPM2B_AUTH (TPM2B_DIGEST) */ + /* tpm_u16(newpw_sz) Digest size, new pw length */ + /* STRING(newpw) Digest buffer, new pw */ + }; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the old password (if any) + * - size of the new password + * - new password + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sws", + offset, oldpw, oldpw_sz, + offset + oldpw_sz, newpw_sz, + offset + oldpw_sz + 2, newpw, newpw_sz); + offset += oldpw_sz + 2 + newpw_sz; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_pcr_setauthpolicy(struct udevice *dev, const char *pw, + const ssize_t pw_sz, u32 index, const char *key) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(35 + pw_sz + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHPOL), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* TPM resource handle */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + pw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(pw_sz) /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(pw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + + /* TPM2B_AUTH (TPM2B_DIGEST) */ + /* tpm_u16(TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) Digest size length */ + /* STRING(key) Digest buffer (PCR key) */ + + /* TPMI_ALG_HASH */ + /* tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256) Algorithm of the hash */ + + /* TPMI_DH_PCR */ + /* tpm_u32(index), PCR Index */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 27; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the password (if any) + * - the PCR key length + * - the PCR key + * - the hash algorithm + * - the PCR index + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "swswd", + offset, pw, pw_sz, + offset + pw_sz, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN, + offset + pw_sz + 2, key, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN, + offset + pw_sz + 2 + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN, + TPM2_ALG_SHA256, + offset + pw_sz + 4 + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN, index); + offset += pw_sz + 2 + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN + 2 + 4; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} + +u32 tpm2_pcr_setauthvalue(struct udevice *dev, const char *pw, + const ssize_t pw_sz, u32 index, const char *key, + const ssize_t key_sz) +{ + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ + tpm_u32(33 + pw_sz + TPM2_DIGEST_LEN), /* Length */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL), /* Command code */ + + /* HANDLE */ + tpm_u32(index), /* Handle (PCR Index) */ + + /* AUTH_SESSION */ + tpm_u32(9 + pw_sz), /* Authorization size */ + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* session handle */ + tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ + /* <nonce> (if any) */ + 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ + tpm_u16(pw_sz), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ + /* STRING(pw) <hmac/password> (if any) */ + + /* TPM2B_DIGEST */ + /* tpm_u16(key_sz) Key length */ + /* STRING(key) Key */ + }; + unsigned int offset = 27; + int ret; + + /* + * Fill the command structure starting from the first buffer: + * - the password (if any) + * - the number of digests, 1 in our case + * - the algorithm, sha256 in our case + * - the digest (64 bytes) + */ + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sws", + offset, pw, pw_sz, + offset + pw_sz, key_sz, + offset + pw_sz + 2, key, key_sz); + offset += pw_sz + 2 + key_sz; + if (ret) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); +} |